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Abstract
Cohen, March and Olsen's Garbage Can Model (GCM) of organizational choice represent perhaps
the first ñ and remains by far the most influential ñagent-based representation of
organizational decision processes. According to the GCM organizations are conceptualized as
crossroads of time-dependent flows of four distinct classes of objects: 'participants,'
'opportunities,' 'solutions' and 'problems.' Collisions among the different objects generate
events called 'decisions.' In this paper we use NetLogo to build an explicit agent-based
representation of the original GCM. We conduct a series of simulation experiments to validate
and extend some of the most interesting conclusions of the GCM. We show that our
representation is able to reproduce a number of properties of the original model. Yet, unlike the
original model, in our representation these properties are not encoded explicitly, but emerge
from general principles of the Garbage Can decision processes.
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 Introduction
1.1
Decisions in organizations can be studied at many different levels of aggregation. For example,
in the analysis of organizational decision making processes a common strategy is to reduce a
complex social activity to an individual constrained optimization problem. In the study of formal
organizations, this analytical strategy emphasizes the information properties of alternative
structural arrangements (Burton and Obel 1995) and the capacities of individual decision
makers (individually and in teams of variable size) to find, exchange and process the various
pieces of information (Miller 2001). Typically — but not invariably — organizational decision
processes are assumed to follow a "logic of consequence" according to which the outcomes of
decisions are evaluated in terms of individual preferences and expectations about future
outcomes (March 1994).
1.2
An alternative way of thinking about how decisions happen in organizations concentrates on the
aggregate flows of decision makers, opportunities for decision-making, problems and solutions
through organizational networks. This perspective focuses on how aggregate regularities are
produced and reproduced through the interaction of elementary components ("agents") defined
at lower levels. Such a view starts with a very different position on what the term "organization"
means when referred to socially constructed entities. Organizations are seen as regulated andpartly self-maintaining flows emerging from the interaction among elementary agents.
According to this view organizational "structure" is represented as an emergent set of
connections between "decision makers," "problems" and "solutions."
1.3
Within the broadly defined field of "Organization Theory," a prominent example of this second
approach to the representation of organizational decision processes is the Garbage Can Model
of organizational choice (GCM), originally proposed by M.D. Cohen, J.G. March and J.P. Olsen
(1972). The motivating claim behind the GCM is that: "Although organizations can often be
viewed conveniently as vehicles for solving well-defined problems […] they also provide sets of
procedures through which participants arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing and
what they have done while in the process of doing it. From this point of view, an organization is
a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations
in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer,
and decision makers looking for work" (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: 2). During the
subsequent three decades the view of organizational decision processes that the GCM
articulates has been extremely influential in a variety of substantive fields in which our
understanding of organizations plays a central role like, for example, political science (Kingdon
1984;Peters 1996), and institutional theory more generally (March and Olsen 1989). To this
day, Cohen, March and Olsen's original statement of the GCM remains perhaps one of the most
frequently cited articles in contemporary organization theory (a recent search on Google Scholar
returned almost 1300 cites) .
1.4
Despite its influence and visibility, we feel that the full potential of the GCM as a model of —
rather than a metaphor for — organizational decision processes has not yet been fully realized.
In our view the main reason behind this state of affairs is related to the fact that that in their
verbal theory Cohen, March and Olsen articulated a clear and very explicit agent-based
representation of organizational decision processes, but the actual model could not reproduce
their verbal theory faithfully because of the technological constraints of the time (early 1970s).
As a consequence the GCM has been frequently treated rather superficially as a metaphor for
organizations as "structured anarchies" paying only superficial attention to its internal logic.
Alternatively, the GCM has attracted detailed criticism stimulated by the obvious — but apposite
— observation that the computer code (that Cohen, March and Olsen reported in an appendix of
the original paper) reflected the verbal theory only loosely.
1.5
In this paper we attempt to narrow the gap between the GCM model and its underlying
theoretical narrative by building an agent-based model of garbage can decision processes.
According to Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006: 1649) an agent-based model is "[A] method for
studying systems (…) composed of interacting agents, and [that] exhibit emergent properties,
that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot be deduced simply by
aggregating the properties of the agents." Because of these two core features, the agent-based
technology that we adopt allows us to go beyond the limits of the GCM and those of its critics
by (i) making explicit the agent-based nature of the original theoretical narrative, and (ii) re-
implementing the GCM in a way that enables direct computer experimentation and facilitates
comparison with the results produced by the original model.
1.6
The first step in this direction involves the careful reconstruction of the GCM in a modelling
environment that allows the reproduction of the agent-based concepts contained in the verbal
theory. Clearly this is not the first attempt to reconstruct the GCM, or translate it into different
languages. Other examples are available that have emphasized and developed different aspects
of the original model (Masuch and LaPotin 1989;Warglien and Masuch 1996;Takahashi 1997).
Since its appearance, the implications of the GCM have also been explored in a number of
empirical contexts (Cohen and March 1974;March and Olsen 1976a;Martin 1981;Lynn
1982;Carley 1986a, 1986b;March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986;Levitt and Nass 1989). A
number of important refinements (March and Olsen 1989;Mezias and Scarselletta 1994) and
extensions (March 1978;Padgett 1980;Lai 1998, 2003) have also been proposed.
1.7
Why dedicate so much attention to such an "old" model? After all so much has happened in
organization theory during the intervening period that spending any time dissecting such an oldmodel may seem like a purely academic exercise. Not so. First of all, the GCM continues to
generate heated debate among students of organizations and institutions (Bendor, Moe and
Schotts 2001), stimulate new applications (Leach 1997;Cherry 2000;Richardson 2001;Romelaer
and Huault 2002;Zahariadis 2003;Lipson 2007), and inspire innovative interdisciplinary debate
(Gibbons 2003). Second, a translation of the original model in the light of contemporary agent-
based technology promises to improve our understanding of aspects of the model that have so
far not received proper attention and that may be conductive of further refinements. Third,
computer simulation has played a special role in the development of organizational theories
(March 2001) and it continues to do so in contemporary research (Lomi and Larsen 2001). We
want to contribute to this tradition by showing how new computational models and tools can be
used to illuminate central problems in the theory of organizations.
1.8
After this general introduction we organize our argument as follows. In the next section we
discuss in some detail the structure of the original model and recall the basic terminology that
Cohen, March and Olsen used to define the identities of the various "objects" — or "agents" — in
their model. In section three we identify specific points of divergence between the verbal theory
and its implementation as a simulation model and we discuss strategies to reconcile this
divergence. In section four we introduce our agent-based reconstruction of the GCM. In section
five we discuss our own translation of the measures of organizational performance that were
defined by Cohen, March and Olsen. Section six contains the main results of our simulation
experiments. We allocate a considerable amount of attention to this section because our
exercise stands or fall on the ability of our model to reproduce the basic analytical insights of
the original model. We conclude the paper with a discussion section in which we also identify a
number of potentially interesting avenues for future research.
 The Garbage Can theory of organizational decisions
2.1
The Garbage Can Model of organizational choice (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) represents a
unique intellectual effort to understand organizational decision-making in a way that neither
reduces organizational decisions to the decisions of individual participants, nor treats
organizations as aggregate unitary collective actors endowed with preferences and clearly
specified objectives. The GCM is not a model of group or coalition formation either, but rather a
description of an ecology of elements that produce decision-making in an organization. The
counterintuitive view of organizational decision process that the GCM portrays represents
perhaps its most distinctive intellectual feature. According to Daft: "The theoretical
breakthrough of the Garbage Can model is that it disconnects problems, solutions and decision
makers from each other, unlike traditional decision theory" (1982: 139. Emphasis ours).
2.2
The Garbage Can theory of decision-making applies to situations characterised by the following
three factors. The first is fluid participation. Fluid participation refers to the well-established
fact that the degree of attention that participants typically dedicate to any one decision problem
is highly variable. The notion of fluid participation also captures the observation that
organizational members tend to enter and exit decision situations according to processes that
are not necessarily related to the problems at hand. The second factor is unclear decision
technology. Unclear decision technology refers to the fact that causal relations underlying
specific organizational decision problems in the form of well specified means-end chains are
frequently ambiguous; all too often, clear causal relationships are only ex-post reconstructions
aimed at rationalising decisions that have already been made (March 1994;Olsen 2001). The
third factor is problematic preferences, a term that Cohen, March and Olsen introduced to
capture the general tendency of decision makers to discover their preferences through action
rather than acting on the basis of pre-defined and unchanging preferences (Cohen, March and
Olsen 1972). Organizations characterized by fluid participation, unclear decision technologies
and problematic preferences were labelled by Cohen, March and Olsen "organized anarchies"
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).
2.3
The GCM describes organizations as a sort of chemical reactors where four kinds of elements
interact. They are the participants to an organization, also called decision-makers, the choice
opportunities that present to them, the solutions they may employ and the problems that they
are called to solve.2.4
These elements exist independently of one another and, although they might disappear as a
consequence of decision-making, their existence is independent of time. Participants do not
retire, choice opportunities may present themselves over and over (e.g., a periodically
scheduled series of meetings), solutions do not age and problems may represent themselves.
Notably, solutions exist independently of problems, implying that decision-makers may seek to
apply pre-defined solutions to the problems that they encounter, rather than the other way
around (Cohen and March 1974;March and Olsen 1976c;Weick 1979, 1995;Lane and Maxfield
2005).
2.5
By means of this seemingly awkward assumption, the GCM captures a fundamental feature of
decision-making. Faced with uncertain environments, decision-makers construct a direction for
acting by re-shaping their past experiences into a coherent picture that enables them to apply a
solution that worked well in the past to their current setting. In this sense, solutions exist
independently of the decision-makers who eventually employ them. The authors of the original
GCM were first to point to this interesting feature of decision-making (Cohen and March
1974;March and Olsen 1976c). Later, Weick (1979, 1995) explored it with greater detail. Lane
and Maxfield (2005) present an empirical example of how this assumption maps onto actual
decision making processes.
2.6
According to the verbal, introductory description of the GCM (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972),
decision situations characterized by fluid participation, unclear decision technology and
problematic preferences generate three possible outcomes, only two of which are decision
styles. The first decision style is characterized by the fact that a problem is actually solved.
Thus, it is called decision by resolution. According to the GCM, decisions are made by
resolution if: (i) the participants to the decision process are sufficiently able; (ii) a sufficiently
good solution is available to them, and (iii) the problems that they are called to solve are
sufficiently simple. The second decision style is defined by decisions that are made without any
attention to existing problems. This is called decision by oversight. Decisions by oversight are
due rituals that confirm the legitimacy of an organization (Di Maggio and Powell 1983), but they
solve no problem. The third outcome, called flight, is no decision in itself. Flying from a difficult
problem consist of attaching it to a different opportunity, for instance one that will be due at a
later time, or one that will be dealt by a colleague (in which case "flight" amounts to buck-
passing). Consequently, a flight from a problem helps to make a decision on the remaining
ones.
2.7
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between decisions by resolution, decisions by oversight
and flights. If neither a decision by resolution nor a decision by oversight can be made, a flight
may allow to consider the decision problem again after the most difficult problem has been set
aside.
Figure 1. The flow chart of the GCM: resolutions and oversights mark the end of decision-
making, flights make it start again2.8
The choice between decision by resolution, decision by oversight and flight is influenced by the
availability of participants, opportunities, solution and problems, as well as by their features.
Participants are characterised by an energy that represents their ability as decision-makers.
Solutions are characterised by an efficiency that represents their effectiveness. Finally, problems
are characterised by an energy that represents their difficulty.
2.9
Think of participants, opportunities, solutions and problems moving randomly in the "chemical
reactor" that represents an organization. If participants, opportunities and solutions meet, but
no problem is there, a decision is made by oversight. If participants, opportunities, solutions
and problems meet, they may make a decision by resolution if the energy (ability) of
participants, weighted by the efficiency of available solutions, is greater than the energy
(difficulty) of problems. Otherwise, the decision process is blocked until its participants succeed
to pass some problems to some other opportunity (by postponing decision-making, buck-
passing, or else). This is a flight. The energy (difficulty) of the remaining problems may still be
too high, in which case the decision process remains blocked. Or, the energy of the remaining
problems may be sufficiently low (the remaining problems are sufficiently simple), in which case
a decision by resolution is made. In the limit, no problem has remained, in which case a
decision by oversight is made.
2.10
The basic GCM described so far has no "organizational structure" in any conventional sense. In
order to overcome this shortcoming Cohen, March and Olsen devised the possibility that either
opportunities and participants, or opportunities and problems, or all of them, receive an
exogenous ordering by "importance." The decision structure specifies which participants are
allowed to make use of which choice opportunities (e.g., only the directors may be allowed to
attend the board of directors). The access structure specifies what problems are handled in
which opportunities (e.g., shop-floor problems may not be allowed to reach the CEO).
2.11
Figures (2) and (3) illustrate the three configurations of the decision structure and the access
structure envisaged by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). Both the decision structure and the
access structure can either be non-segmented, hierarchical or specialized.
Figure 2. The decision structure can either be non-segmented (left), hierarchical (centre) or
specialized (right). In the matrices a "1" indicates that the row element has access to the
column elementFigure 3. The access structure can either be non-segmented (left), hierarchical (centre) or
specialized (right). In the matrices a "1" indicates that the row element has access to the
column element
2.12
In the matrices reported in Figures 2 and 3 a "1" in cell aij indicates that the element in the i-th
row has access to the element in the j-th column. For this reason, within the GCM the matrices
are typically interpreted as access structures.
2.13
Non-segmented, hierarchical and specialized structures are characterized as follows:
Non-segmented. A decision structure is non-segmented if all participants are allowed to
attend all choice opportunities. An access structure is non-segmented if all problems can
be discussed in all opportunities. Non-segmented decision structure and non-segmented
access structure is the default setting of the GCM.
Hierarchical. A decision structure is hierarchical if participants are not allowed to attend
choice opportunities that are more important than their own level. An access structure is
hierarchical if problems cannot be discussed in opportunities that are more important
than their own level.
Specialized. A decision structure is specialized if each participant can only attend choice
opportunities of his own level of importance. An access structure is specialized if each
problem can only be discussed in opportunities of its own level of importance.
Note that this characterization does not account for the possibility that two or more participants
(or problems, or opportunities) have the same importance. This is a clear departure from real
organizations, where two or more decision-makers may be at the same hierarchical level or —
in other words — have the same role. However, the GCM is a stylized conceptual model, not a
realistic representation of any specific case.
2.14
Despite the obvious limits imposed by the procedural language used at the time, the GCM
represents a clear example of agent-based thinking — perhaps the first example in theories of
organizations and one of the first in the social sciences together with Schelling's dynamic model
of residential segregation (Schelling 1971). In fact, the GCM is defined in terms of four classes
of discrete agents (participants, opportunities, solutions and problems) and of simple rules of
interaction among these agents.
2.15
What we do in the next section is to review the internal structure of the original model and to
translate it into a more explicit agent-based representation of organizational decision
processes. Subsequently, we shall check whether the results found by Cohen, March and Olsen
still hold. Although a few of the original conclusions appear as artefacts of the 1972
implementation, the basic insights of the original model are confirmed over a wide range of
parameters.
 A closer look at the GCM
3.1The original description of the GCM (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) entailed several
inconsistencies in terminology, as well usage of terms suggesting different meanings from
those that were actually implied. The description of §1 is consistent and — we believe —
coherent with the spirit of the GCM. However, it differs from the original description in the
following three respects:
The word "technology" is introduced in the following passage (Cohen, March and Olsen
1972: 1): "The second property is unclear technology. Although the organization manages
to survive and even produce, its own processes are not understood by its members. It
operates on the basis of simple trial-and-error procedures, the residue of learning from
the accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions of necessity". We believe that
the meaning of "technology" as "trial-and-error procedures" as mentioned in the GCM has
neither to do with technical specifications as in engineering, nor with the ratio of output to
input as in microeconomics. In order to avoid misunderstandings, we employed the
expression "unclear decision technology" which, in our intentions, should convey the idea
that not only the goals of an organization may be ill-defined, but also the means to reach
them. In a later publication, March and Olsen (1976b) write: "The first [lack of clarity] is
the ambiguity of intentions. Many organizations are characterized by inconsistent and ill-
defined objectives. It is often impossible to specify a meaningful preference function for
an organization that satisfies both the consistency requirements of theories of choice and
the empirical requirements of describing organizational motive. The second lack of clarity
is the ambiguity of understanding. For many organizations the causal world in which they
live is obscure. Technologies are unclear; environments are difficult to interpret. It is hard
to see the connections between organizational actions and their consequences". We deem
that understanding technologies as "connections between organizational actions and
consequences" supports our choice of the term "decision technologies".
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972: 2) claim that "To understand processes within
organizations, one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various
kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated". Later
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: 3) they define "choice opportunities" as one of the four
agents of the model — the others being participants, solutions and problems. However,
from that point onwards, as well as in the abstract of the original article, the expression
"choice opportunities" is often shortened into "choices". Furthermore, "choice" is also
employed as a synonymous of "decision". We believe that this terminology is misleading.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, we shortened "choice opportunities" into
"opportunities" and used this word consistently. Furthermore, we employed the word
"decision" and dropped the word "choice" altogether.
In the original article (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: 8), flights are defined as follows: "In
some cases choices [opportunities] are associated with problems (unsuccessfully) for
some time until a choice [an opportunity] more attractive to the problems comes along.
The problems leave the choice [the opportunity], and thus it is now possible to make the
decision". In our exposition of §1, we adhered to this definition. Thus, we defined two
decision styles (by resolution and by oversight), plus a trick to unleash blocked decision
processes. However, a few lines later Cohen, March and Olsen (1972: 8) warn that their
implementation of flights differs from their own definition: "Some choices [decisions]
involve both flight and resolution — some problems leave, the remainder are solved.
These have been defined as resolution, thus slightly exaggerating the importance of that
style. As a result of that convention, the three styles are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
with respect to any one choice [decision]". Note that, by accepting this approximation,
Cohen, March and Olsen's computational model has three decision styles. This
circumstance contributed to a great deal of the misunderstandings that surround the
GCM; in our opinion, it is of the utmost importance to revert to the formulation entailed in
the first quotation above. In summary, we note that Cohen March and Olsen first defined a
'flight' as a decision of letting an element fly out of a blocked decision process, but later,
in the computational model, they understood this as a kind of resolution. We deem it is
important that the definition is used, rather than the approximation.
3.2
Making use of our terminology, let us examine the details of Cohen, March and Olsen's
computational model. The model involves 10 participants, 10 choice opportunities and 20
problems that interact along 20 simulation steps (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). Participants,
opportunities and problems flow in and out according to the following schedules:The 10 participants are in the organization from the very beginning and never exit it.
The 10 opportunities enter the organization one at a time during the first 10 simulation
steps. Each time a decision is made, the corresponding opportunity exits.
The 20 problems enter the organization two at a time during the first 10 simulation steps.
Each time a decision is made, the problem(s) that were eventually involved exit(s) the
organization.
3.3
Solutions do not exist as independent variables. Rather, solutions are approximated by a
coefficient that multiplies the energy of all participants. The simulations are carried out keeping
this coefficient constant. This is equivalent to assume that there exists one single solution
which is used in all decisions. Thus, it never exits the organization.
3.4
However, Cohen, March and Olsen inform us in a footnote that simulations were carried out,
where the solution coefficient changed at each step (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: 5). This
amounts to assume that at each step the one single solution is replaced, but still, no
independent population of solutions exists.
3.5
Participants and problems are characterised by energy values that represent their ability as
problem-solvers and their level difficulty as problems, respectively. For any opportunity i the
following magnitudes are introduced:
XERC(i) denotes the energy required at opportunity i in order to resolve the problems that
impinge on it. XERC stands for required energy;
XEE(i) denotes the energy that can be expended by the participants who are at
opportunity i. XEE stands for expended energy.
3.6
At opportunity i, a decision is made if the required energy is not greater than the expended
energy. The corresponding FORTRAN instruction is (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: Appendix):
XERC(i) ≤ XEE(i) (1)
3.7
If condition (1) is satisfied with XERC(i) > 0, this means that the energy of participants is greater
than the energy of problems. A decision is made by resolution. If condition (1) is satisfied with
XERC(i) = 0, this means that no problem is there. A decision is made by oversight. If condition
(1) is not satisfied, a flight is in order.
3.8
Condition (1) is in accord with the verbal statements of the GCM. However, important
discrepancies emerge as soon as we examine the algorithms by which XERC(i) and XEE(i) are
computed.
3.9
The energy required at opportunity i is equal to the sum of the energies of the problems at i.
Let XERP(j) denote the energy required to resolve problem j. The corresponding FORTRAN
instruction is (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: Appendix):
XERC(i) = XERC(i) + XERP(j) (2)
3.10
For each opportunity i, the instruction (2) is repeated for all problems j that arrive at i. Thus, the
energy required at opportunity i accumulates with the problems that impinge on it. Figure 4
illustrates the mechanism of instruction (2).Figure 4. The energy required at the i-th opportunity is the sum of the energies of the
problems that impinge on it
3.11
The energy that can be expended on opportunity i is the sum of the energies of the participants
that attend this opportunity. Let XSC(lt) be the solution coefficient in the time interval lt. Let
XEA(k, lt) denote the energy contributed by participant k during the interval lt. The
corresponding FORTRAN instruction is (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972: Appendix):
XEE(i) = XEE(i) + XSC(lt) * XEA(k, lt) (3)
3.12
For each opportunity i, the instruction (3) is repeated on all participants k that reach i. Thus, the
energy that can be expended at opportunity i accumulates with the participants that attend it.
Figure 5 illustrates the mechanism of instruction (3).
Figure 5. The energy that can be expended at the i-th opportunity is the sum of the energies
of the participants that attend it
3.13
At each simulation step, participants and problems select an opportunity with the constraints
imposed by the decision structure and the access structure, respectively. Among all
opportunities that comply with these constraints, they select the one where, in the previous
step, a decision by resolution was closest to obtain. This idea is implemented by selecting the
opportunity that, in the previous step, minimised the following indicator (Cohen, March and
Olsen 1972: Appendix):
s = XERC(i) - XEE(i) (4)
3.14
Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) pointed out that, particularly because of eq.(4), Cohen, March
and Olsen's computational model is quite different from their own verbal exposition of the GCM
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). In fact, eq.(4) makes all participants and all problems move in
block to one opportunity at a time (Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001). So in the end, if all
participants and all problems move together, if only one opportunity is exploited at each step
and if only one solution exists, Cohen, March and Olsen's computational model describes an
aggregate dynamics that has little to do with random encounters of participants, opportunities,
solutions and problems.
3.15
Olsen (2001) replied to Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) with the argument that this architecture
was chosen because it conveys the idea that the members of an organization often move
through choice opportunities meeting the same problems again and again but never solve them.
Indeed, this is one of the main results of Cohen, March and Olsen's simulations (Cohen, Marchand Olsen 1972). However, precisely because they want it to be an emergent property of the
model, it should not be prescribed by design. In §5 we shall see that, in our agent-based
version of the GCM, the fact that the members of an organization meet the same problems
again and again arises naturally from the basic premises of the Garbage Can theory of decision-
making. Thus, we are able to strengthen Cohen, March and Olsen's argument while at the same
time accepting Bendor, Moe and Shotts' technical criticism. In fact, we show that even if
participants and problems do not move together — a feature of the original model that Bendor,
Moe and Shotts rightly criticised — the main results still hold.
3.16
Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) also pointed out that since participants and problems move in
block, flights are such that all problems leave the opportunity where they were blocking the
decision process. Thus, after a flight a decision by oversight is necessarily made. However, as
we have seen in Figure 1, in general a flight might enable a decision by resolution, a decision by
oversight, or it might not enable any decision at all.
3.17
Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) stress that this problem is even more serious. In fact, within one
single simulation step not only all problems, but also all participants leave the opportunity if a
flight takes place. Thus, flights are such that decisions are made without problems and without
participants, just because XERC(i) is set to zero while XEE(i) remains at its value.
3.18
We deem that the problems highlighted by Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) are serious and
should be taken seriously. The fact that solutions have not been modelled by Cohen, March and
Olsen (1972) as independent agents is a fundamental departure from the verbal expression of
the GCM, but even more disturbing is the way those agents behave, that should interact with
one another. Participants, opportunities and problems, instead of acting according to the
outcomes of pairwise interactions, move all together and act all together as if they were one
single agent. It seems that, in spite of its verbal expression, in its computational
implementation (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) the GCM became an aggregate model.
3.19
Our agent-based version of the GCM does not merely aim at substituting an obsolete modelling
technology with a more modern and appropriate one. Rather, we want to make use of the
opportunities offered by the more modern technology — agent based modelling — in order to
build a computational implementation of the GCM that is coherent with its verbal expression.
 Garbage Can Decision Processes in an Agent-Based Perspective.
4.1
Our agent-based model is implemented on the NetLogo platform. The code is distributed under
the GNU public license. It is available on the NetLogo web site among the User Community
Models.
4.2
Unlike Cohen, March and Olsen's computational model, but consistently with their verbal
description of the GCM, we define four kinds of agents: participants, opportunities, solutions
and problems. These agents move on a torus that represents an organization. Entry and exit
from the simulation environment are interpreted as entry and exit from the organization,
respectively.
4.3
Figure 6 illustrates the parameters that regulate the entry and exit of agents. The user can
choose the initial number of agents (initial-number-of-participants, initial-number-of-
opportunities, initial-number-of-solutions, initial-number-of-problems), impose
exogenous in- or out-flows (by means of positive or negative values of net-flow-of-
participants, net-flow-of-opportunities, net-flow-of-solutions, net-flow-of-problems)
as well as the time step where these flows eventually stop (stop-flow-par-at, stop-flow-opp-
at, stop-flow-sol-at, stop-flow-pro-at). Furthermore, the user can choose whether
participants, opportunities, solutions and problems exit the organization after they have been
involved in a decision (participants-exit?, opportunities-exit?, solutions-exit?,
problems-exit?). By means of these parameters, it is possible to explore the GCM in a widevariety of conditions, including those assumed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972).
Figure 6. The parameters that regulate the entry and exit of agents. Initial number, exogenous
flows, interruption of exogenous flows, and exit of agents once they have been involved in
decision-making
4.4
Decision and access structures are selected by means of the buttons illustrated in Figure 7. Our
NetLogo implementation facilitates experimentation with alternative access structures that can
be specified in the appropriate panel by simply entering a "0" for a non-segmented structure, a
"1" for a hierarchical structure and a "2" for a specialized structure. If the structure is either
hierarchical or specialized, participants and problems are ordered by increasing importance
according to their identification number.
Figure 7. The buttons that select the decision structure (left) and the access structure (right).
Non-segmented structures are denoted by 0, hierarchical structures are denoted by 1,
specialized structures are denoted by 2
4.5
Consistently with the verbal statement of the GCM, each participant is endowed with an 'energy'
that represents its ability as decision-maker. A problem is endowed with an 'energy' that
represents its level of difficulty. Each solution is characterised by an efficiency value. Following
the insight of Cohen, March and Olsen's verbal theory — but in contrast with their own
computational model — in our model not only participants and problems are generally
heterogeneous with respect to energy, but also solutions are generally heterogeneous with
respect to efficiency. In fact, by means of proper control buttons the user of the model can
choose the distribution of energy among participants and problems as well as the distribution
of efficiency among solutions.
4.6
Figure 8 shows the buttons that regulate the distribution of energy and efficiency. Following
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), the distribution of energy among participants and problems, as
well as the distribution of efficiency among solutions, can be selected according to the three
following distributions:
If the parameter dist-energy-par is set to 0, increasing levels of energy (from min-
energy-par to max-energy-par) are distributed to participants of increasing importance.
If the parameter dist-efficiency is set to 0, increasing levels of efficiency (from min-
efficiency-sol to max-efficiency-sol) are distributed to solutions of increasing
importance. If the parameter dist-energy-pro is set to 0, increasing levels of energy
(from min-energy-pro to max-energy-pro) are distributed to problems of increasing
importance. Since the ordering of participants by importance is only effective if the
decision structure is either hierarchical or specialized, only in these cases it makes sense
to set dist-energy-par to 0. Likewise, since the ordering of problems by importance is
only effective if the access structure is either hierarchical or specialized, only in these
cases it makes sense to set dist-energy-pro to 0. The possibility of distributingefficiency according to the importance of solutions is added for completeness, but has no
counterpart in the original model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).
If the parameter dist-energy-par is set to 1, energy levels are drawn from a uniform
distribution in the [min-energy-par, max-energy-par] interval and assigned randomly to
participants. If the parameter dist-efficiency is set to 1, efficiency levels are drawn
from a uniform distribution in the [min-efficiency-sol, max-efficiency-sol] interval
and assigned randomly to solutions. If the parameter dist-energy-pro is set to 1, energy
levels are drawn from a uniform distribution in the [min-energy-pro, max-energy-pro]
interval and assigned randomly to problems. Since all rankings by importance are ignored,
these options make sense if both the decision structure and the access structure are non-
segmented. Also note that drawing from a uniform random distribution is a generalisation
with respect to Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), where all participants, all solutions and all
problems had the same values. This case can be obtained by posing min-energy-
par=max-energy-par, min-efficiency-sol=max-efficiency-sol and min-energy-
pro=max-energy-pro.
If the parameter dist-energy-par is set to 2, increasing levels of energy (from min-
energy-par to max-energy-par) are distributed to participants of decreasing importance.
If the parameter dist-efficiency is set to 2, increasing levels of efficiency (from min-
efficiency-sol to max-efficiency-sol) are distributed to solutions of decreasing
importance. If the parameter dist-energy-pro is set to 2, increasing levels of energy
(from min-energy-pro to max-energy-pro) are distributed to problems of decreasing
importance. Since the ordering of participants by importance is only effective if the
decision structure is either hierarchical or specialized, only in these cases it makes sense
to set dist-energy-par to 2. Likewise, since the ordering of problems by importance is
only effective if the access structure is either hierarchical or specialized, only in these
cases it makes sense to set dist-energy-pro to 2. Also in this case, the possibility of
distributing efficiency according to the importance of solutions is added for completeness
but has no counterpart in the original model (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).
Figure 8. The buttons that specify the energy distribution, its minimum and maximum values
and whether the energy values are shown aside the agents
4.7
By default, participants, opportunities, solutions and problems move randomly on the torus. A
grid is defined on the torus, which identifies a finite number of squares. Decisions and flights
are made according to the following rules:
If at least one participant, at least one opportunity, at least one solution find themselves
on the same square and if no problem is there, a decision by oversight is made. If several
participants are on the square, all of them are involved. If several opportunities are on the
square, one of them is chosen at random to be involved in decision-making. If several
solutions are on the square, one of them is chosen at random to be involved in decision-
making.
If at least one participant, at least one opportunity, at least one solution and at least one
problem find themselves on the same square, a decision by resolution can be made if the
following condition is satisfied:
(5)
where Ai denotes the ability (the energy) of the i-th participant, ej denotes the efficiency
of the j-th solution, Dk denotes the difficulty (the energy) of the k-th problem and IS, JS,
KS denote the set of participants, solutions and problems on square S, respectively.According to (5), if several participants and several problems are on the square, all of
them are involved in decision making. If several opportunities are on the square, one of
them is chosen at random to be involved in decision-making. If several solutions are on
the square, only the most efficient one is involved in decision making.
If at least one participant, at least one opportunity, at least one solution and at least one
problem find themselves on the same square but condition (5) is not satisfied, the
decision process is blocked. All agents stay on the square.
A blocked decision process can be unleashed if an opportunity, in its random movements,
ends on a square where a decision process is blocked. If this happens, the most difficult
problem among those that are blocking the decision process is attached to the newly
arrived opportunity, which goes away with it: This is a flight. The opportunity and the
problem move together randomly until they meet a solution and (at least) one participant
such that condition (5) is satisfied. The destiny of the agents remaining on the square
takes one of the following branches:
If the problem that was carried away was the only problem on the square, no
problem remains to be solved. In this case, the flight is followed by a decision by
oversight.
If at least one problem remains after the most difficult one has been carried away,
and if condition (5) is satisfied, the flight is followed by a decision by resolution.
If at least one problem remains after the most difficult one has been carried away,
but condition (5) is not yet satisfied, the decision remains blocked. Eventually, it will
be unleashed by another flight.
4.8
These rules translate into the flow chart of Figure 9, which describes the possibility tree at each
particular square. The flow chart of Figure 9 is our instantiation of the flow chart of Figure 1.
Figure 9. The flow chart at a particular square. The program goes through the five rhombi
along the diagonal during one single step. The sixth rhombus at the bottom requires one step
by itself. If the loop on the right is entered, the two last rhombi on the diagonal require one
simulation step
4.9
Figure 10 is a snapshot of a portion of the torus where agents interact. Participants are depicted
as blue squares, opportunities as orange arrows, solutions as red circles and problems as
yellow triangles.Figure 10. A snapshot of the simulation screen. Blue squares are participants, orange arrows
are opportunities, red circles are solutions and yellow triangles are problems
4.10
The dynamics of Figure 9 can be recognized in Figure 10. At (1), a decision process is blocked.
In fact, we see a mass of agents piled up on a single square, which they cannot leave. At (2), we
see three examples of an opportunity (an orange arrow) taking away a problem (the yellow
triangle behind it). Other agents are moving freely.
4.11
The ensuing section 4 translates the indicators of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) into our
framework. In the subsequent section 5, the results obtained by Cohen, March and Olsen will be
revisited.
 Performance in Garbage Can Organizations
5.1
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) analysed the behaviour of their model by means of several
indicators, which we attempted to replicate in our agent-based context. Figure 11 illustrates
their monitors.
Figure 11. The monitors of the main indicators of the model, grouped by the agents on which they
are based
5.2
Since Cohen, March and Olsen's computational model is quite different from our agent-based
version (see sections 2 and 3), the transposition of its indicators into our context is not trivial.
Even the names of the indicators do not always correspond, also because Cohen, March and
Olsen (1972) sometimes defined an indicator with a sentence but did not give a name to it. Let
us examine these indicators one by one.
Problem Jumps
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) count "the total number of times that any problem shifts
from one choice [opportunity] to another". We translated this indicator with "Problem
Jumps", counting the number of times a problem jumps from one opportunity onto
another one. In our model, this indicator is equivalent to the number of flights; it has
been included only for compatibility with Cohen, March and Olsen's model. However, since
Cohen, March and Olsen's model is such that all problems move in block from one
opportunity to another (Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001), our indicator is inherently
different from theirs.
Problem Bindings
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) count "the total number of time periods that a problem isactive and attached to some choice [opportunity], summed over all problems". By means
of this indicator Cohen, March and Olsen want to express the idea that a problem might
be solved because a choice opportunity is there, but instead it is not solved. We expressed
this idea by means of the length of time a problem cannot be solved, either because it is
in a blocked decision process where participants have too low energy or because it is
flying away with an opportunity. Following Cohen, March and Olsen, we summed this
quantity over all problems. In order to express the idea that a problem is "attached", or
bound to an opportunity, we called this indicator "Problem Bindings".
Problem Latency Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) define "Problem Latency" as "the total
number of periods a problem is active, but not attached to a choice [opportunity], summed over
all problems". We interpreted "being active" as "being in the organization" and measured
problem latency by the length of time a problem is in the organization without being bound to
any opportunity. Following Cohen, March and Olsen, we summed this quantity over all
problems.
Unsolved Problems
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) count "the total number of problems not solved at the end
of the 20 time periods". Following this statement, we defined the indicator "Unsolved
Problems" as the number of problems in the organization at the end of the simulation.
Note that this indicator only makes sense if — as in the case of Cohen, March and Olsen's
simulations — problems exit the organization once they have been solved. Since it is not
necessarily so, our model allows to select this mode or its opposite by means of the
switch problems-exit?. Obviously, Unsolved Problems is computed only if this switch is
ON.
Participant Jumps
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) measure "the total number of times that any decision-
maker shifts from one choice [opportunity] to another". We translated this indicator with
the number of times a participant leaves an opportunity after staying some time with it.
This happens because of a flight. However, this indicator is not equivalent to the number
of flights that cause decision-making because several participants may be involved.
Similarly to Problem Jumps, our indicator may be inherently different from Cohen, March
and Olsen's because their model is such that all participants move in block from one
opportunity to another (Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001).
Participant Bindings
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) count "the total number of time periods a decision-maker
is attached to a choice [opportunity], summed over all decision-makers". In our model, a
participant is bound to an opportunity over several time steps only when it is involved in a
blocked decision process. Thus, we defined "Participants Bindings" as the length of time a
participant cannot make a decision because (s)he is involved in problems for which (s)he
does not have sufficient energy, summed over all participants.
Used Energy
Cohen, March and Olsen measure "the total amount of effective energy available and
used". By "effective energy available and used", Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) mean
participants's energy multiplied by the solution coefficient that, in their computational
model, stands for solutions as independent agents. However, since participants use their
energy independently of the solutions that they employ, we deem that the efficiency of
solutions should have no place in this definition. Furthermore, Used Energy should be
defined also when decisions are made by oversight so the efficiency of the solution does
not play any role. Thus, our indicator Used Energy measures the cumulative energy
expended by all participants involved in decision-making, both by resolution and by
oversight.
Excess Energy
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) measure "the total effective energy used on choices
[decisions] in excess of that required to make them at the time they are made". In our
context, this is the difference between the cumulative energy used by all participants who
resolved problems, multiplied by the efficiency of the solution that they employed (i.e.,
Used Energy), and the cumulative energy of all the problems that they solved. Excess
energy is not computed when a decision is made by oversight.
Unexploited Opportunities
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) measure "the total number of choices [decisions] not
made by the end of the 20 time periods". If opportunities exit when a decision is made,
then the number of opportunities in the simulation denotes the number of unexploited
occasions for making a decision. Thus, we defined Unexploited Opportunities as the
number of opportunities left at the end of the simulation. This indicator is not available ifthe switch opportunities-exit? is OFF.
Waiting Time
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) measure "the total number of periods that a choice [an
opportunity] is active, summed over all choices [opportunities]". In fact, if opportunities
exit when a decision is made, then the time they spent in the organization measures the
time before a decision was made. Thus, we defined an indicator Waiting Time as the time
to be waited before a choice opportunity is used, i.e. the cumulative lifespan of all
opportunities. This indicator is not available if the parameter opportunities-exit? is
OFF.
5.3
If the decision structure is either hierarchical or specialized participants are characterised by a
degree of importance, meaning that only certain participants are allowed to make use of certain
opportunities. Likewise, if the access structure is either hierarchical or specialized problems are
characterised by a degree of importance, meaning that only certain problems gain access to
certain choice opportunities. In both cases, choice opportunities are ordered by their
importance as well.
5.4
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) make certain claims concerning the quality of decision-making
(by oversight or by resolution) depending on the importance of opportunities. In order to verify
these claims, we need indicators of the number of resolutions and oversights per classes of
importance of opportunities. Since some of these claims involve the possibility of different
trends within classes of low importance and classes of high importance, we need to subdivide
opportunities in at least four classes of importance in order to verify all claims.
5.5
The degree of importance of opportunities, just like the degree of importance of participants
and problems, is indicated by their identification number. The lowest numbered opportunities
are the most important ones. Since the number of opportunities may vary during a simulation,
the classes of importance of opportunities must be defined in percent terms with respect to
their current population. Four quartiles have been defined by subdividing opportunities into
four groups of equal size at each simulation step.
%O-I reports the percentage of decisions by oversight over total decisions, that are made
on opportunities in first quartile. The first quartile entails one fourth of all opportunities,
the most important ones.
%O-II reports the percentage of decisions by oversight over total decisions, that are made
on opportunities in the second quartile. The second quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, just less important than those of the first quartile.
%O-III reports the percentage of decisions by oversight over total decisions, that are made
on opportunities in the third quartile. The third quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, less important than those of those of the second quartile and yet not the
least important ones.
%O-IV reports the percentage of decisions by oversight over total decisions, that are
made on opportunities in the fourth quartile. The fourth quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, the least important ones.
%R-I reports the percentage of decisions by resolution over total decisions, that are made
on opportunities in first quartile. The first quartile entails one fourth of all opportunities,
the most important ones.
%R-II reports the percentage of decisions by resolution over total decisions, that are made
on opportunities in the second quartile. The second quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, just less important than those of the first quartile.
%R-III reports the percentage of decisions by resolution over total decisions, that are
made on opportunities in the third quartile. The third quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, less important than those of the second quartile and yet not the least
important ones.
%R-IV reports the percentage of decisions by resolution over total decisions, that are
made on opportunities in the fourth quartile. The fourth quartile entails one fourth of all
opportunities, the least important ones.
These indicators are not available if the opportunities do not exit the organization after
decision-making, or if both the decision structure and the access structure are non-
segmented. Furthermore, even if these conditions are satisfied these indicators remainunavailable until at least one decision is made.
 Results
6.1
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) drew the following conclusions from their simulations:
1.  Only a few decisions solve problems. Most decisions are made by oversight.
2.  The efficiency of an organized anarchy depends on the energy (difficulty) of the problems
that it is called to solve.
3.  Some problems stay unsolved for a long time, independently of the structure of decisions
and the structure of accesses.
4.  Participants and problems chase one another across choice opportunities. Thus, the
participants have the impression of facing always the same problems.
5.  If opportunities are ordered by importance, then the most important opportunities are
least likely to solve problems.
6.  If opportunities are ordered by importance, then the unexploited opportunities are most
often the most important and the least important ones.
7.  If problems are ordered by importance, then the most important problems are solved
first.
8.  Hierarchical and specialized structures have non-linear effects that cannot be isolated
from one another.
6.2
These properties have been derived from simulations lasting 20 steps, where 10 participants
are present all the time, 10 opportunities enter the organization one at each step during the
first 10 steps and 20 problems enter the organization two at each step during the first 10 steps.
All participants had energy (ability) equal to 0.55, the solution coefficient was 0.6 and all
problems had energy (difficulty) equal to 1.1, 2.2 or 3.3. We want to translate these parameters
into our model, check the above properties (1)-(8) at the settings of Cohen, March and Olsen
and, subsequently, in more general conditions.
6.3
The following parameters are as close as possible to those employed by Cohen, March and
Olsen (1972). Let us impose that all participants have energy (ability) equal to 1.0, that all
solutions have efficiency equal to 1 and that all problems have energy (difficulty) equal to 1.5.
In this way, similarly to the original setting it is necessary to have at least two participants in
order to solve a problem. In general we run the simulation for 200 steps (instead of 20), with
100 participants (instead of 10) who never exit the organization, and 200 opportunities (instead
of 10) entering the organization during the first 100 steps and exiting it after they have been
used for making a decision. In some experiments we run the simulation assuming 100 solutions
that never exit the organization and 400 (instead of 20) problems that enter the organization
during the first 100 steps and exit it after they have been solved.
6.4
Most parameters have been multiplied by 10 with respect to the original simulation (Cohen,
March and Olsen 1972). However, a higher proportion of opportunities is necessary because
they are not selected deterministically as in the original simulation. The proportion of problems
is also higher than in the original simulation, making it even more likely that decisions are made
by resolution and thus stressing the final result. Henceforth, these values will be referred to as
base values.
6.5
Our NetLogo implementation of the GCM disconfirms properties Nos. 6, 7 and 8, which may be
considered not to be any longer relevant or meaningful. In contrast, properties Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 are confirmed. Their validity across alternative implementations of the GCM suggests that
these properties can illuminate a number of interesting aspects of the original model. Let us
examine them in detail.
Most Decisions are made by Oversight.
6.6
The first property of the GCM is that most decisions are made by oversight. Indeed, Figure 12shows that at base values the proportion of decisions by oversight is much higher than the
proportion of decisions by resolution.
Figure 12. The proportion of decisions by oversight and by resolution with respect to total
decisions, with all parameters at base values. Outcomes have been averaged over 100 runs
6.7
This result is very stable for any parameters configuration. The reason is simply that it is much
more likely that three agents are in the same position (a participant, an opportunity and a
solution) than that four agents are in the same position (a participant, an opportunity, a
solution and a problem) and, furthermore, that the condition (5) is satisfied.
6.8
This dynamics makes our result even more robust than in Cohen, March and Olsen's original
simulations. In fact, in Cohen, March and Olsen's model there did exist parameters
configurations where most decisions were made by resolution. On the contrary, in our agent-
based version of the GCM this result holds for any parameter configurations, even very far from
base values.
6.9
A similar pattern is observed if we distinguish between flights that cause decisions by oversight
and flights that cause decisions by resolution. However, Figure 13 shows also that most flights
do not cause any decision at all. Eventually, they may be followed by another flight after some
time.
Figure 13. The proportion of flights followed by decisions by oversights, flights followed by
decisions by resolution and flights without immediate consequences when all parameters are at
base values. Outcomes have been averaged over 100 runs
6.10
Outcomes of experiments where parameters were set very far from their base values indicate
that there exist configurations such that the number of flights that cause decisions by
resolution is approximately equal to the number of flights that cause decisions by oversight.
However, in these cases the total number of decisions is rather small.
Efficiency Depends on the Difficulty of Problems
6.11
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) claim that the efficiency of an organization, measured by its
ability to solve problems, decreases with problem difficulty. Specifically, they measure the un-
efficiency of decision making by means of the following compound indicators:The activity of problems, measured by the number of jumps made by a problem from an
opportunity to another one (Problem Jumps), by the number of steps during which a
problem is bound to a particular opportunity (Problem Bindings) and by the number of
unsolved problems (Unsolved Problems) at the end of the simulation.
The activity of participants, measured by the number of jumps made by a participant from
an opportunity to another one (Participant Jumps), by the number of steps during which
a participant is bound to a particular opportunity (Participant Bindings), by the amount
of energy used (Used Energy) and by the energy used in excess with respect to what had
been strictly necessary (Excess Energy) at the end of the simulation. However, we have
checked that the ratio of Used Energy to total decisions and the ratio of Excess Energy to
resolutions are better descriptors of the inefficiency of decision-making (Fioretti and
Lomi 2008).
The difficulty to make a decision, measured by the number of unexploited opportunities
(Unexploited Opportunities) and by the time to wait before a decision is made (Waiting
Time) at the end of the simulation.
The number of flights and the number of decisions by oversight at the end of the
simulation. However, we have checked that the ratio of oversights to total decisions is a
better indicator of the inefficiency of decision-making (Fioretti and Lomi 2008).
6.12
All these indicators are expected to increase with the difficulty of problems. Cohen, March and
Olsen claim that they do, though only aggregate values (of unspecified indicators) are shown in
their article (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).
6.13
Figure 14 illustrates the percent variations of the above indicators with respect to the difficulty
of problems. Their values have been set at 100 when the difficulty of problems is 0.5. Since the
percent variations differ widely from one another, logarithmic values have been shown.
Figure 14. The indicators proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) to represent the
inefficiency of decision making, plotted as functions of the difficulty of problems. Logarithmic
scale of percent values. Original values have been averaged over 100 runs
6.14
Figure 14 highlights that the following indicators are particularly sensitive to the difficulty of
problems: Problem Bindings, Participant Jumps, Participant Bindings, and Flights. Since
all these indicators are closely related to the number of flights, we may conclude that this is the
feature of decision-making that is most affected by the difficulty of problems.
6.15
Casual explorations of the parameters space have shown that this property is robust for all
values of difficulty greater than the product of average efficiency with average ability, and
smaller than the product of average efficiency with the sum of the abilities of a number of
participants that, given the total number of participants and the available space, are sufficiently
likely to gather at an opportunity.6.16
Finally, Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) also claim that in organizations with specialized
decision structure and non-segmented access structure the efficiency of decision-making is
independent of the difficulty of problems, but that this only occurs because such organizations
simply do not solve any problem. Our agent-based model does not confirm this claim (Fioretti
and Lomi 2008).
Many Problems Remain Unsolved
6.17
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) observed that many problems stay unsolved for quite a long
time. Thus, they asked whether particular decision or access structures would perform better
under this respect.
6.18
Since in their setting — as well as according to our "base values" — when a decision by
resolution is made the corresponding problem exits the organization, March and Olsen
evaluated the tendency not to solve problems by means of the following indicators:
The time spent by problems inside the organization before some participant attempts to
solve them (Problem Latency);
The number of unsolved problems in the organization at the end of the simulation
(Unsolved Problems);
The time an opportunity remains in an organization, waiting for a decision to be made on
it (Waiting Time).
6.19
We evaluated these indicators with all parameters at base values, but, since we aimed at
reaching general conclusions, we also explored a neighbouring region in parameters space.
Since we know that the difficulty of problems may affect efficiency (§5.2), we measured the
above indicators for problem difficulty at 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5 (all other parameters at base values).
Figures (15), (16) and (17) illustrate the results.
Figure 15. Problem latency, number of unsolved problems and waiting time when problem
difficulty is at 0.5. The labels N, H and S denote the non-segmented, hierarchical and
specialized structure, respectively. All other parameters at base values. Outcomes have been
averaged over 100 runsFigure 16. Problem latency, number of unsolved problems and waiting time when problem
difficulty is at 1.5. The labels N, H and S denote the non-segmented, hierarchical and
specialized structure, respectively. All other parameters at base values. Outcomes have been
averaged over 100 runs
Figure 17. Problem latency, number of unsolved problems and waiting time when problem
difficulty is at 2.5. The labels N, H and S denote the non-segmented, hierarchical and
specialized structure, respectively. All other parameters at base values. Outcomes have been
averaged over 100 runs
6.20
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) carried out a separate analysis of each indicator. Let us
compare their findings with those produced by our model:
Problem Latency
According to Cohen, March and Olsen hierarchical and specialized decision structures
decrease problem latency. In contrast, hierarchical and specialized access structures
increase problem latency. In our model, hierarchical decision structures may slightly
decrease problem latency if the access structure is non-segmented and all parameters are
at base values but in general, the effect is in the opposite direction. Also specialized
decision structures always increase problem latency. These results are different from
those of Cohen, March and Olsen. However, in our as in the original simulation
hierarchical and specialized access structures increase problem latency.
Unsolved Problems
According to Cohen, March and Olsen hierarchical and specialized decision structures
increase the number of unsolved problems. In contrast, hierarchical and specialized
access structures decrease the number of unsolved problems. Our model confirms the
first claim, but falsifies the second one. In fact, hierarchical or specialized structures mark
a sharp increase of the number of unsolved problems. A partial exception is the
configuration with hierarchical decision structure and non-segmented access structure
when problem difficulty is 0.5, in which case the increase of the number of problems is
not as large as in the other cases — see Figure 15.
Waiting Time
According to Cohen, March and Olsen hierarchical and specialized decision structures
increase the waiting time. Furthermore, hierarchical and specialized access structures
have "in most cases" the same effect. According to our model, hierarchical and specialized
access structures increase the waiting time if they are combined with specialized decisionstructures but, if problem difficulty is sufficiently large, they can decrease the waiting
time if they are combined with a non-segmented or hierarchical decision structure.
6.21
In general, our agent-based model suggests that hierarchical or specialized structures increase
all three indicators. Furthermore, it points to the following notable properties:
If the decision structure is non-segmented and if the difficulty of problems is sufficiently
high, hierarchical or specialized access structure are able to decrease the waiting time,
though the other two indicators increase.
The configuration with hierarchical decision structure and non-segmented access
structure is quite peculiar. It is the only configuration where, if problem difficulty is
sufficiently low, the number of unsolved problems increases very little with respect to the
configuration where both structures are non-segmented. It is also the only configuration
where, if problem difficulty is sufficiently high, latency can slightly decrease with respect
to the configuration where both structures are non-segmented.
Independently of access structure and independently of the difficulty of problems, if the
decision structure is specialized the waiting time is extremely high.
The Same Problems Again and Again
6.22
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) claimed that in the GCM participants and problems chase one
another across choice opportunities. Thus, the participants have the impression of facing the
same problems again and again.
6.23
This claim has been challenged by Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001), who observed that this is not
an emergent property of Cohen, March and Olsen's simulation but rather a hypothesis of their
implementation of the GCM. In fact, Cohen, March and Olsen's implementation of the GCM
requires that all participants and all problems utilise one choice opportunity at a time. Thus, all
participants meet always the same problems because they are forced to do so. It is not a
spontaneous consequence of the verbal theory, but an artefact obtained by adding a mechanism
that is not in the theory.
6.24
Olsen replied to Bendor, Moe and Shotts that this property is crucial to the GCM and, for this
reason, it was explicitly included in the computational model (Olsen 2001). Nevertheless, it
would be interesting if it could simply emerge from the general principles of the GCM, rather
than being imposed on it.
6.25
Let us run the model with the assumption that, each time a decision is made, the opportunities,
the solutions and the problems involved in it exit the organization. In contrast, participants
stay. In this conditions it is possible to define approximate measures for the fraction of times
that participants meet opportunities, solutions and problems that they have already met.
6.26
The number of times that a participant meets an opportunity is approximately equal to the
number of decisions by resolution and by oversight, plus the number of flights because the
participant meets an opportunity that takes away a problem, plus the number of meetings spent
on blocked decision processes because s(he) meets the same opportunity again and again. Let
us suppose that meetings on blocked decision processes are made with the purpose of
disengaging decision-making by means of a flight. Thus, the number of these meetings is also
equal to the number of flights. Since only this last term refers to meetings with opportunities
that have already been met, the fraction of dejà vu opportunities is:
(6)
6.27
The number of times that a participant meets a solution is approximately equal to the numberof decisions by resolution and by oversight, plus the number of meetings spent on a blocked
decision process because (s)he meets the same solution again and again. With a similar
reasoning as above, the fraction of dejà vu solutions is:
(7)
6.28
The number of times that a participant meets a problem is approximately equal to the number
of decisions by resolution plus the number of meetings spent on a blocked decision process
because (s)he meets the same problem again and again. With a similar reasoning as above, the
fraction of dejà vu problems is:
(8)
6.29
Equations (6), (7) and (8) are exact if all meetings concern one participant, one opportunity, one
solution and eventually one problem. To the extent that this is not the case, they yield
approximate values.
6.30
Let us run the model for 200 steps with 200 initial participants, opportunities, solutions and
problems, no in- or outflows except that opportunities, solutions and problems (but not the
participants) exit the organization once decisions are made, non-segmented structures and
energy levels at base values. We obtain dopp ≈ 13.4%, dsol ≈ 15.5% and dpro ≈ 63.2%. Figure 18
illustrates these figures.
Figure 18. Percentage of the total number of encounters with opportunities, solutions and
problems, that occur with opportunities, solutions and problems that have already been met. In
order to measure these quantities it has been stipulated that opportunities, solutions and
problems exit the organization once a decision is made, and that no other in- or out-flows
take place. All other parameters are at base values. Outcomes have been averaged over 100
runs
6.31
Note that, in order to measure these quantities, we had to stipulate that not only opportunities
and problems, but also solutions exit the organization after a decision is made. Furthermore, in
order not to distort measurements with spurious data, all exogenous in- and outflows were set
to zero. Having done this, the number of initial participants, opportunities, solutions andproblems had to be changed. Even if their initial number was chosen to keep the simulation as
close as possible to its base values, a departure from the parameters used in the previous
sections could not be avoided.
6.32
Since it is not possible to make the above measurements for all possible combinations of
parameters, the above results cannot claim the same generality as those of the previous
sections. However, by running the model with random combinations of admissible parameters
the numerical outcomes change but the prevalence of dejà vu problems remains. Thus,
qualitatively the results of Figure 18 are relatively general in the context of the model.
6.33
These results confirm Cohen, March and Olsen's claim. Notably, they have emerged
spontaneously from the assumptions of the GCM. In fact, according to these assumptions the
problems that block decision-making may eventually fly away and subsequently represent
themselves. For this reason, participants end up with chasing the same old problems.
Few Problems are Solved on Important Opportunities
6.34
If either the decision structure or the access structure is hierarchical, the ordering of
participants or problems in terms of importance reflects into an ordering of opportunities.
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) remarked that in these conditions on the most important
opportunities very few decisions are made by resolution, much less than on the least important
ones.
6.35
This property is intriguing, because it has a straightforward interpretation in the real world. In
fact, it suggests that problems are actually solved at the shop floor, whereas deciding by
oversight would be the rule for top managers.
6.36
In order to observe this property it is necessary to choose parameters that enable a large
number of decisions by resolution. There should be enough many problems to solve and,
furthermore, the energy distribution should be such that the problems of highest energy
(difficulty) find participants of a corresponding high energy (ability).
6.37
In our simulator the distribution of energy may either be proportional to importance, or
inversely proportional to importance. According to the first option, the most important
participants have the greatest ability and the most important problems are the most difficult
ones. According to the second option, the most important participants have the least ability and
the most important problems are the least difficult. We deem that, for the purposes of this
simulation, it is correct to select the first option both for participants and for problems.
6.38
Let us start with 100 participants, 200 opportunities, 100 solutions and 400 problems.
Exogenous flows do not exist but, similarly to the setting of §4.1, opportunities and problems
exit the organization after having been involved in decision-making. Energy values from 0 to 2
are distributed to participants and problems in order of importance, efficiency is equal to 1 and
uniformly distributed to solutions. Simulations have been run for different numbers of steps.
6.39
Our model is able to measure the percentage of decisions by resolution on opportunities of
different degree of importance (by means of %O-I, %O-II, %O-III, %O-IV, %R-I, %R-II, %R-III,
%R-IV). Figure 19 reports these values for different combinations of structures distinguishing
decisions by resolution depending whether they have been made on the 50% most/least
important opportunities.Figure 19. The percentage of decisions by resolution on the most important opportunities
(white bars) and the least important opportunities (black bars), for various combinations of
non-segmented (N) and hierarchical (H) structures. Outcomes have been averaged over 100
runs
6.40
Figure 19 confirms the claim made by Cohen, March and Olsen. In fact, the fraction of
resolutions on the most important opportunities (white bars) is always lower than the fraction of
resolutions on the least important opportunities (black bars).
6.41
Notably, Cohen, March and Olsen's claim has been extended to the configuration where both
structures are hierarchical. Unfortunately, the configurations where one structure is hierarchical
and the other one is specialized could not be considered because too few decisions were made
by resolution. The results are robust with respect to parameter variations that still produce a
large number of decisions by resolution, but the measurements cannot be carried out beyond
this range.
6.42
All results have been shown for simulations running 100, 200, 400 and 800 steps in order to
show why it happens that on the least important opportunities more decisions by resolution are
made. In fact, most indicators show that the proportion of decisions by resolution first
increases, then decreases with the number of steps. This means that in an initial phase the least
important opportunities are preferred because all participants and all problems are allowed to
use them. Subsequently, after the least important opportunities exited the organization only the
most important ones can be used. Thus, the property that most decisions by resolution happen
on the least important opportunities merely arises from the fact that all participants and all
problems can access them.
 Discussion and Conclusions
7.1
Our main goal in this paper was to re-interpret the original GCM as an agent-based model and
verify whether the new representation would reproduce the insights that the original
formulation supported. Although some among the less important conclusions had to be revised
in the light of the results that we have reported, the main claims supported by the original GCM
appear to be confirmed. In particular we found that — for a very wide range of parameter values
— most decisions are indeed made by oversight. Furthermore, the decisions by oversight are
made on the most important opportunities. Consequently, problems tend to stay unsolved for a
long time and participants meet the same problems again and again.
7.2
An innovative aspect of our current work is that the properties of the GCM that we have
observed in our simulation experiments do not derive directly from the internal structure of ourmodel — a critique frequently made to Cohen, March and Olsen's original simulation model
(Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001). Rather, we showed that these properties emerge from patterns
of interaction among the agents that populate the "Garbage Can world" that we have re-created
on the basis of the indications contained in the original paper. This observation suggests that
other interesting speculations might be explored with relative minor modifications of the
current model.
7.3
The analytical objectives that we pursued in this paper forced us to implement a rather literal a
translation of the original GCM. As a consequence our own model suffers from many of the
limitations of the original model. Yet, in the context of our representation these limitations
suggest potentially interesting directions for future research. We identify at least four broad
categories of limitations of the current model that may be conductive of future research efforts.
7.4
The first category of limitations is inherent to the assumption of independence between the
different flows of agents that populate the model. In the light of more recent studies on
organizational decision processes one limitation of the original GCM is its insistence on the
independence of "problems," "solutions," and "participants" (decision makers). This has attracted
severe criticism because within the GCM the decision makers appear as completely uninterested
in the decisions they take (Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001). As a consequence the GCM seems to
lack some of the characteristics that we tend to associate more readily with organizations like,
for example, routinisation, stabilisation and differentiation (Padgett 1980;Nelson and Winter
1982) or knowledge integration and knowledge management properties (Spender 1996;Spender
and Grant 1996). Future refinements of the model could address this problem by equipping the
different agents with more specific identities (not only with levels of energy). In this case
specific problems could be taken only by specific decision makers and specific solutions could
attach themselves only to specific problems. We feel that this joint representation of "resources"
and "identities" would be a very fruitful direction for future research particularly in the light of
the new literature on "identity-based" definitions of organizational forms (Hsu and Hannan
2005).
7.5
The second category of limitations of our current modelling effort is strictly related to the first.
Agents in the GCM have no memory and therefore can form no expectations about future
encounters. For the same reasons agents in the GCM cannot have meaningful search or learning
strategies — an implication that seems at odds with established behavioural theories of
organizations (Cyert and March 1963;Nelson and Winter 1982;Cohen and Sproull 1996;Greve
2003). Related to this point more attention could be dedicated to the representation of the
degree of ambiguity that a given opportunity represents. This could be done, for example, by
designing a probabilistic mechanism that regulates the outcome of the interaction between
"problems," "decision makers," and "solutions." These limitations should not be particularly
difficult to overcome in future refinements of the basic model. More recent research on
organizational decision making that has emphasized the "forward looking" character of
organizational decisions (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000) is likely to provide useful indications
about how to design appropriate expectation formation mechanisms that may regulate and
guide the problem-solving activity of the agents. A first step in this direction has been taken by
Ashworth and Louie (2002) who attempt to align — or "dock" — the Garbage Can and the NK
models.
7.6
The third category of limitations providing a clear opportunity for future research, concerns the
lack of evolutionary mechanisms that regulate the dynamics of the original GCM in which arrival
of different categories of agents into the model are simply generated by a stochastic queuing
process. One direction in which we think the current model could be extended involves the
design of evolutionary mechanisms responsible for the reproduction of the various agents at
internal rates that may depend — for example — on some measure of relative "fitness." A similar
direction is pursued by Lomi and Cacciaguerra (2003) in the context of a model of Garbage Can
-like decision processes in which all the entities have differential reproduction rates that
depend on their accumulated levels of energy.
7.7
Finally, it may be useful to reflect on the behaviour of the model across different scales anddifferent patterns of entry and exit of the agents. A greater size of the model may simply imply
an increase in the number of interacting agents but also an increase in hierarchical levels so
that different "garbage cans" may be coupled within a complex hierarchy of decision processes
(Baum 1999). In this paper we followed the lead of the original model and limited out attention
to a small set of actors that enter the organization according to a schedule as similar as possible
to the one employed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). How the results that we have reported
would change across different scales, different event schedules, and across multiple hierarchical
levels remains a matter for speculation. In particular, no prediction is possible about the ability
of Garbage Can decision processes to coordinate organizational behaviour at much higher levels
of system size and with more complex — possibly interdependent — rates of arrival and
departure of the different agents into the model.
7.8
In the light of these various limitations our current effort is perhaps best understood as a fist
step in the direction of reaching a fuller understanding of how computational approaches can
shed light on a variety of issues that are of interest to students of organizations in the context
of simulation models constrained and defined by clear theoretical claims.
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